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Some commentators have argued that the housing crisis may harm labor markets because homeowners
who owe more than their homes are worth are less likely to move to places that have productive job
opportunities. I show that, in the available data, negative equity does not make homeowners less mobile.
In fact, homeowners who have negative equity are slightly more likely to move than homeowners
who have positive equity. Ferreira, Gyourko and Tracy's (2010) contrasting result that negative equity









The decline in housing prices over the past several years has left many homeowners
owing more on their mortgages than their houses are worth. As of the summer of 2010, about
10 percent of all housing units were occupied by owners who had negative equity.1 Ferreira,
Gyourko, and Tracy (2010, hereafter FGT) report that homeowners who have negative equity
are one-third less likely to move. This nding, in combination with the wide dispersion in
unemployment rates across the country, has raised concerns that the weak housing market is
keeping unemployment high by preventing homeowners who have negative equity from moving
to better job markets (e.g., Batini et al., 2010; Fletcher, 2010; The Economist, 2010).2
In this paper, I argue that the concerns are misplaced. I show that FGT found fewer
moves among negative-equity homeowners because FGT systematically drop some negative-
equity homeowners' moves from the data. FGT analyze data from the U.S. Census Bureau's
American Housing Survey (AHS), which is a panel survey of homes. AHS surveyors go to
the same homes every two years and record who lives there. Consider a house that is owner
occupied in 2005. Four outcomes are possible in 2007: (1) the house is occupied by the
same owners as in 2005; (2) it is occupied by dierent owners; (3) it is occupied by dierent
1Estimates of the fraction of mortgages that are under water vary but are generally around 23 percent.
Zillow (2010) estimated that 23.2 percent of single-family homeowners with mortgages had negative equity in
the third quarter of 2010, while CoreLogic (2010) estimated that 22.5 percent of homes with mortgages had
negative equity at the end of the second quarter. According to 2009 American Community Survey data |
the most recent available from the U.S. Census Bureau | 66 percent of housing units are owner occupied,
and 68 percent of owner-occupied units have mortgages. Thus, the CoreLogic and Zillow estimates imply
that about 15 percent of owner-occupied homes have negative equity and about 10 percent of housing units
are occupied by owners with negative equity.
2FGT are not the only authors who have studied the eect of negative equity on mobility. Chan (2001)
nds that homeowners with negative equity are less mobile. Engelhardt (2003) nds that nominal loss aversion
reduces mobility, but low equity due to house price declines does not reduce mobility. However, as FGT point
out, these papers use geographically and demographically restrictive samples, and it is important to examine
nationally representative data.people, who are renters; or (4) it is vacant.3 FGT shared their computer code with me, and
I examined how they treat these four cases. Uncontroversially, FGT code (1) as indicating
that the 2005 occupants did not move and (2) as indicating that the 2005 occupants moved.
However, when (3) or (4) occurs, FGT code the \moved" variable as missing and drop the
observation from the sample. This coding assumes that people with negative equity are no
more likely than people with positive equity to leave a house vacant or rent it out when
they move. If, instead, people with negative equity are more likely to leave a house vacant
(perhaps due to foreclosure) or rent it out (perhaps because they prefer to hold the property
in hopes it will appreciate), then FGT will systematically drop negative-equity moves from
the sample and will mistakenly conclude that negative-equity homeowners move less than
they actually do. In this paper, I reanalyze FGT's data, but I recode cases (3) and (4) |
renters and vacancies | as moves, since the homeowners did indeed move in these cases. I
nd that with this change in coding, negative-equity homeowners are more rather than less
likely to move.
Theoretical predictions about the eect of negative equity on mobility are ambiguous.
People with negative equity may be liquidity constrained and unable to move unless they
default on the loan, which they may prefer not to do for a variety of reasons. Down payment
requirements for mortgages may also prevent liquidity-constrained negative-equity homeown-
ers from buying comparable houses if they move. Further, owning a house with negative
equity is like taking a highly leveraged position in the real estate market; the owner may
want to continue holding the house in hopes of making a large gain if the house appreciates
3I discuss in section 2 how the AHS records occupancy status when no one is home to be interviewed and
how I handle the possibility that owner-occupants become renters while remaining in the same house.
2(Foote, Gerardi, and Willen, 2008). On the other hand, if sucient appreciation to repay
the loan is unlikely, the owner's best choice may be to default, especially if the loan is nonre-
course (Ghent and Kudlyak, 2010). In addition, even if it is optimal to hold the house as an
investment, owners can still move if they nd tenants to rent the property. It is ultimately
an empirical question whether the forces that reduce mobility are stronger or weaker than
the forces that increase mobility. My analysis shows that, in the available data, the forces
raising mobility are stronger.4
I use the theoretical predictions as a further check on the results. The more negative a
homeowner's equity becomes, the greater the benets of default, and the lower the likelihood
that prices will rise enough to cover the debt. Thus, all else equal, homeowners with extremely
negative equity should be more likely to move than homeowners with slightly negative equity.
I show that the data bear out this theoretical prediction when using my coding of moves
but not when using FGT's coding. Using my coding, homeowners with extremely negative
equity are more mobile than those with slightly negative equity, whereas using FGT's coding,
homeowners with extremely negative equity are less mobile than those with slightly negative
equity. However, because the sample size is small, these dierences are not statistically
signicant.
One must be cautious, of course, in extrapolating from my ndings to the current
4FGT's data do not reveal why homeowners moved or whether they sold the house, rented it out or
suered foreclosure, so I cannot use the data to determine which specic forces are at work. It is dicult
to bring additional data to bear on the issue because few datasets measure homeowners' equity and their
subsequent mobility and are large enough to contain a meaningful number of negative-equity homeowners.
I have also analyzed the relationship between negative equity and mobility in the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP), which is a panel survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. In the SIPP,
too, I found that negative-equity homeowners are more mobile. However, the migration variables in the
SIPP contain coding inconsistencies, and the Census Bureau has not yet released corrected versions of the
public-use data les for the SIPP that would permit an accurate analysis.
3policy debate. FGT's data measure homeowners' equity in years ranging from 1985 to 2005.
Negative equity was quite unusual until recently; people who have negative equity in 2010
may dier in a variety of ways from those who had negative equity four or more years
ago, and negative equity may have dierent impacts on the mobility of dierent kinds of
people.5 Negative equity may also have dierent impacts in strong and weak economies,
or in economies with dierent prevailing interest rates. Conclusive work on the impact of
negative equity in the current environment will therefore have to wait until more recent
data are available. However, based on available data, there appears to be no evidence that
negative equity reduces homeowners' mobility. In addition, my ndings are consistent with
research that uses recent data to examine other aspects of the impact of negative equity. For
example, Valletta (2010) nds that recent house price declines have had equal eects on the
unemployment durations of homeowners and renters, contrary to what one would expect if
negative equity makes it more dicult for homeowners to move for jobs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shows how changing the coding of rented
and vacant homes reverses FGT's results. Section 3 compares the mobility of homeowners
with slightly negative and extremely negative equity. Section 4 concludes.
2. Consequences of coding choices in the FGT data
FGT's data come from the AHS, a panel survey of homes that records who lives in
a given home | and an array of individual, household, and housing characteristics | every
two years. FGT analyze the eect of having negative equity in year t on the probability that
a household moves between t and t + 2. My focus here is on the denition of the mobility
5Because negative equity was so unusual until recently, the existing data do not contain enough negative-
equity households to analyze heterogeneity in the eects of negative equity.
4variable, and I refer the reader to FGT's paper for details on other aspects of their data.
Since the goal is to study the mobility of homeowners, FGT restrict the sample for each year
t to homes that are owner occupied in that year. FGT then measure mobility by examining
who occupies the home in year t + 2.
As I explain in the introduction, FGT drop from the sample all cases where a house
is owner occupied in year t but is vacant or rented6 in year t + 2. I make only one change to
FGT's data: I code these cases as moves.
It is important to consider how the AHS records data on homes where eld repre-
sentatives cannot interview any occupant, either because the home is vacant or because its
occupants refuse to answer the survey. AHS eld representatives collect data on vacant
homes by interviewing \informed people such as landlords, rental agents, or knowledgeable
neighbors" (U.S. Census Bureau, 1999, p. v). In these cases, the dataset's \interview status"
variable records that the representative conducted a \vacant interview." If eld representa-
tives do not interview anyone, the status is \non-interview." The \tenure" variable, which
records whether an occupied home is owner occupied or renter occupied, is usually based on
occupants' responses to the survey and usually blank for vacancies and non-interviews. How-
ever, if the eld representative determines that a home is occupied but cannot interview the
occupants, the tenure variable is not blank. Instead, it is lled based on occupants' answers
in past years or, if this is impossible, it is lled at random: 60 percent of cases are allocated
to owners and 40 percent to renters (Vandenbroucke, 2008, p. 42).
FGT make a variety of careful editing changes to ensure that they can track owner-
6Throughout, when I refer to renters, I include the small number of non-owner households that occupy
homes without payment of cash rent.
5occupants from year to year even if data on the household are missing or incorrect in some
years. Suppose that, after these changes, year t is the last year in which a certain household
denitely occupied a given house. In coding whether the household moved between t and
t + 2, FGT treat randomly allocated data at t + 2 identically to data based on interviews.
Thus they retain cases where the year-t + 2 tenure variable is allocated as owner occupied
and drop cases where the year-t + 2 tenure variable is blank or allocated as renter occupied.
In restoring owner-to-renter and owner-to-vacant transitions to the data, I consider
four alternative codings of moves. For alternative 1, I follow FGT and treat allocated data
identically to interview-based data. That is, if year t is a household's last known year in a
home, alternative 1 codes the household as moving between t and t + 2 whether the home is
recorded as owner occupied, renter occupied, or vacant in year t+2, and whether these data
are based on an occupant interview, a vacant interview, or allocation for a non-interview.
Alternative 1 runs the risk of mistakenly coding a move if the household did not move
but simply failed to be interviewed and the Census Bureau allocated a renter occupancy or
vacancy. According to the allocation procedures cited above, this error should never happen
because the Census Bureau will ll in the tenure variable from the previous year's answer,
which is \owner occupied." Nonetheless, I use a second alternative coding to verify that the
results do not depend on how non-interview data are handled. Alternative 2 drops all cases
where year t is a household's last known year in a home and the year-t + 2 observation is a
non-interview.
An additional risk with both alternative 1 and alternative 2 is that some renter occu-
pancies at t + 2 may involve households that were owner-occupants at t, sold the home to a
new owner between t and t+2, and then rented the home back, thus remaining in place but
6becoming renters at t +2. It is not possible to perfectly identify such cases in the data. The
data for year t + 2 include a variable, SAMEHH, that indicates whether any member of the
year-t household is also an occupant in year t+2. According to this variable, the year-t and
year-t+2 households overlap in about one-third of the switches from owner occupied to renter
occupied. However, the AHS codebook reports that the SAMEHH variable can be inaccu-
rate.7 Also, if the SAMEHH variable is correct, one in every 65 house-year observations and
one in every 11 owner-occupant transitions involve households selling their homes, renting
them back, and not moving; it seems unlikely a priori that so many households sell their
homes without moving. I thus view SAMEHH as giving an upper bound on which switches
from owner to renter do not involve moves. As a robustness check, I consider alternative
codings | 10 and 20 | where I code renter occupancies at t+2 as moves if SAMEHH shows
that no member of the year-t household is present in year t+2; non-moves if SAMEHH shows
that any member of the year-t household is present in year t + 2; and missing in the small
number of cases where SAMEHH is missing or recorded as \don't know." Alternative 10 is
thus identical to alternative 1, and alternative 20 is identical to alternative 2, except that in
each case I code some renter occupancies at t+2 as moves and some as non-moves, and drop
others.
Table 1 lays out the possible data for year t+2, how many observations fall under each
possibility, how FGT code each one, and how I code each one for alternatives 1, 2, 10, and
20. Table 2 shows how the coding changes disproportionately add moves by negative-equity
7See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2009, pp. 489, 1267, and 1274. The codebook
recommends comparing variables other than SAMEHH to accurately determine whether a household moved.
FGT indeed use variables other than SAMEHH to identify moves. However, some of these variables, such as
the purchase year, are collected only for owner-occupants, so they cannot be used to identify cases where a
household did not move but changed from owning to renting.
7homeowners. When homeowners with positive equity move, they are followed about two-
thirds of the time by new owner-occupants (the cases FGT include) and about one-third of
the time by renters or vacancies (the cases FGT drop). But when homeowners with negative
equity move, they are followed only half of the time by new owner-occupants, and half of the
time by renters or vacancies. Under alternative 1, including owner-to-renter and owner-to-
vacant transitions as moves increases positive-equity households' moves by 51 percent, but
the change more than doubles negative-equity households' moves. Under alternative 2, the
coding change increases positive-equity households' moves by 36 percent and negative-equity
households' moves by 78 percent. Even when I treat renter-occupancies as non-moves if the
possibly inaccurate SAMEHH variable shows any overlap between the year-t and year-t + 2
households, under alternatives 10 and 20, I still nd that my coding change disproportionately
increases negative-equity households' moves.
The raw data thus show that negative-equity and non-negative{equity homeowners
are about equally likely to move by FGT's denition, but that negative-equity households
are much more likely to move by the alternative denitions. Neither of these patterns reveals
the causal eect of negative equity on mobility, however, because other factors might aect
the propensity to move and might be correlated with negative equity. FGT control for other
variables that might aect mobility by estimating a probit model of the form
Pr(household i moves between t and t + 2) = F(xit); (1)
where xit includes an indicator variable for whether household i has negative equity in year t as
well as a set of demographic and economic controls: two nancial variables that could reduce
8the propensity to move | a measure of certain California property-tax benets and a measure
of whether the household has a xed-rate mortgage at below-current rates; demographics;
income; changes in demographics, income, and neighborhood quality between t   2 and t; a
cubic in years in the house; MSA xed eects; and region-specic and California-specic year
eects.8
Table 3 reports the results of estimating the probit model using FGT's denition of
moves and using the alternative denitions. Using FGT's denition, negative equity slightly
but insignicantly reduces the probability of moving. Using the alternative denitions, nega-
tive equity raises the probability of moving by 1 to 3 percentage points, holding constant the
household's demographics and its economic situation. Relative to the overall probability of
moving in the sample, this is an increase of 10 to 18 percent. The increase in moves among
negative-equity homeowners is signicantly dierent from zero at the 5 percent level for three
of the four alternative denitions.
FGT calculate equity from self-reported property values and mortgage balances. Be-
cause self-reported property values may be noisy estimates of true values, the negative-equity
variable may be a noisy measure of whether a homeowner actually has negative equity. Such
measurement error could bias the coecient on the negative-equity variable toward zero.
FGT try to correct the bias by constructing a second measurement of each homeowner's
equity based on the original purchase price of the home and average home price appreciation
in the metropolitan area in the years since the home was bought. FGT then use an instru-
mental variables (IV) probit estimator9 and nd that negative equity signicantly reduces
8FGT do not use the sampling weights when estimating the model, and I do not do so here. In unreported
results, I found that using the sampling weights does not appreciably change the results.
9Specically, the \ivprobit" command in the Stata software package.
9mobility. I do not report instrumental variables estimates with the alternative move variables
for three reasons. First, the IV probit estimator is not valid when the instrumented variable
| in this case, the indicator variable for negative equity | is binary (Wooldridge, 2002,
p. 472). FGT's IV probit estimates thus do not reveal the causal eect of negative equity
on mobility.10 Second, because the mismeasured variable is binary, the measurement error
here is not classical measurement error (where the measurement error is uncorrelated with
the true value of the variable) but rather misclassication error. In such a situation, linear
instrumental variables is not valid, either (Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001, p. 3732), so
it would not be helpful to estimate a linear probability model with instrumental variables.
Third, misclassication error can bias a coecient toward zero but cannot change its sign,
except if (a) the probability of misclassication exceeds 0.5 or (b) the true coecient is small
and statistically dicult to distinguish from zero. It seems unlikely that homeowners are so
ill-informed about home values that they would report the sign of their equity incorrectly
more than half the time. As for statistical signicance, the probit estimates of the eects of
negative equity on the alternative move variables are signicantly positive, so a valid correc-
tion for measurement error would not be expected to produce negative coecients in place
of the positive ones.11
In sum, what the FGT data show is that homeowners who report having negative
10Constructing a valid correction for measurement error here is not trivial because FGT's probit model also
includes two continuous explanatory variables that may be measured with error. The appropriate correction
involves a system of four simultaneous equations, in which two dependent variables are continuous and two
are discrete, that must be estimated by simulated maximum likelihood or generalized method of moments.
11For comparison, I have also applied the invalid IV probit estimator to the alternative move variables. IV
probit gives a positive eect of negative equity on mobility for alternative denition 1; a practically zero eect
for alternative denitions 2 and 10; and a negative, statistically insignicant eect for alternative denition 20.
That is, even the invalid IV probit estimator does not nd statistical evidence that negative equity reduces
mobility. These results are available on request.
10equity are less likely to move and be followed by another owner-occupant, but more likely to
move and be followed by a renter or a vacancy | and 10 to 18 percent more likely to move
overall, all other factors being equal. If self-reported equity is a noisy measure of true equity,
and if homeowners take steps to learn their true equity before deciding whether to move,
these results likely understate the true amount by which negative equity raises mobility.
3. Mobility and the depth of negative equity
As discussed above, theory suggests that a homeowner whose debt greatly exceeds the
value of the home will be more likely to default (and thus move) than a homeowner whose
debt only slightly exceeds the value of the home. Testing this prediction is of independent
interest. In addition, the prediction provides a useful check on the coding of moves: Assuming
that the theory is correct, the data should match the theory when moves are coded correctly.
I divide negative-equity homeowners into two groups: those with loan-to-value ratios
between 100 percent and 114 percent (the median in the data among those with negative
equity), and those with loan-to-value ratios at or above 114 percent. I then include a dummy
variable for each of these groups in the probit model (1). The coecient on a group's dummy
variable measures that group's mobility relative to homeowners with non-negative equity
(loan-to-value ratio at or below 100 percent), all else equal.12 Theory predicts that mobility
should be higher in the group with loan-to-value ratios at or above 114 percent than in the
group with loan-to-value ratios between 100 percent and 114 percent.
Table 4 shows the results. Under all four of my alternative codings, the estimates
12Dividing negative-equity homeowners this way instead of including the loan-to-value ratio in the probit
model prevents the small number of observations with extreme reported loan-to-value ratios from unduly
inuencing the results. Some homeowners report debts that are several times the reported value of their
homes.
11match the theory: Mobility is highest among homeowners with extremely negative equity.
However, under FGT's coding, the estimates contradict the theory: Mobility is lowest among
homeowners whose equity is most negative. In all cases, unfortunately, the dierences between
the two negative-equity groups are not statistically signicant because so few homeowners in
the data have negative equity. Nonetheless, to the extent that my coding of moves is correct,
the data provide some suggestive evidence in favor of the theory that the depth of negative
equity aects the chance that a homeowner will move.
4. Conclusion
The sharp decline in housing prices has undoubtedly wrought great hardship for many
Americans. Beyond the damage to households' balance sheets, negative equity may be so-
cially harmful if it reduces homeowners' incentives to invest in their homes and communities
(Haughwout, Peach, and Tracy, 2009). But I show in this paper that, based on the available
data, there is one harm that negative equity does not do: It does not reduce mobility. Using
the same data as FGT but analyzing all the data rather than a subset of it, I nd that home-
owners with negative equity are at least as mobile as those with positive equity, holding other
characteristics constant. Homeowners with extremely negative equity are especially mobile.
The most important caveat is that the data are several years old. When more up-to-date
data become available, they may of course show dierent eects.
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16Table 2: Added observations with alternative denitions of moves.
Non-negative equity Negative equity
Denition of moves Non-movers Movers Dropped Non-movers Movers Dropped
FGT 53,317 6,853 3,492 1,447 186 198
84% 11% 5% 79% 10% 11%
Alternative 1 53,317 10,345 - 1,447 384 -
84% 16% - 79% 21% -
Alternative 2 53,317 9,347 998 1,447 331 53
84% 15% 2% 79% 18% 3%
Alternative 10 53,958 9,636 68 1,493 336 2
85% 15% 0% 82% 18% 0%
Alternative 20 53,792 8,826 1,044 1,483 293 55
84% 14% 2% 81% 16% 3%
See table 1 for denitions. Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
17Table 3: Probit estimates of the eect of negative equity on mobility under ve
denitions of moves.
Marginal eect on probability of moving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable FGT def. alt. def. 1 alt. def. 2 alt. def. 10 alt. def. 20
Negative equity -0.002 0.029 0.022 0.019 0.013
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 61,803 65,493 64,442 65,423 64,394
See table 1 for denitions of moves. All models include all of the controls listed in Ferreira,
Gyourko, and Tracy (2010): xed-rate mortgage lock-in, Proposition 13 property tax lock-in,
rst-time homebuyer, marital status, change in marital status, head's education, head's race,
head's sex, cubic in head's age, household size, positive and negative change in household
size, log real household income, positive and negative change in log real household income,
positive and negative change in neighborhood quality, cubic in years in the current house,
MSA xed eects, region-specic year eects, and California-specic year eects. Estimated
coecients on the controls are available upon request. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors clustered by household are in parentheses.
18Table 4: Probit estimates of the eect of negative equity on mobility for dierent levels
of negative equity.
Marginal eect on probability of moving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable FGT def. alt. def. 1 alt. def. 2 alt. def. 10 alt. def. 20
Negative equity 0.000 0.016 0.012 0.011 0.007
(100%<LTV<114%) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Negative equity -0.004 0.042 0.033 0.026 0.019
(LTV114%) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
p-value for equal eects 0.81 0.16 0.23 0.39 0.49
Observations 61,803 65,493 64,442 65,423 64,394
p-value for equal eects is p-value for the 2-test of the null hypothesis that the coecients on negative
equity (LTV <114%) and negative equity (LTV 114%) are equal. See table 1 for denitions of moves.
All models include all of the controls listed in Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (2010): xed-rate mortgage
lock-in, Proposition 13 property tax lock-in, rst-time homebuyer, marital status, change in marital
status, head's education, head's race, head's sex, cubic in head's age, household size, positive and negative
change in household size, log real household income, positive and negative change in log real household
income, positive and negative change in neighborhood quality, cubic in years in the current house, MSA
xed eects, region-specic year eects, and California-specic year eects. Estimated coecients on the
controls are available upon request. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by household
are in parentheses.
19